Book 2, Of the Passions

Book 2, Part 1, Of Pride and Humility

Book 2, Part 2, Of Love and Hatred

Book 2, Part 3, Of the Will and Direct Passions

Before

AS all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and secondary. This division of the impressions is the same with that which I formerly made use of when I distinguish’d them into impressions of sensation and reflection... Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.

T 2.1.1.1

Before

The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility...

T 2.1.1.2

Before

When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into direct and indirect. By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities. This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security. I shall begin with the former.

T 2.1.1.4

After

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.

E 2.3

After

It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that... it is impossible for us to think of any thing, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses...

Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connexion ..., let us see, whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impression.

E 7.4, 7.9

After

Besides those passions above-mentioned [desire, aversion, hope, and fear], which arise from a direct pursuit of good and aversion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or consideration. Thus Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.

Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or services: Hatred, the contrary.

P 2.1-2

Editing the Treatise

Your Thoughts & mine agree with Respect to Dr Butler, and I wou’d be glad to be introduc’d to him. I am at present castrating my Work, that is, cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it shall give as little Offence as possible; before which I cou’d not pretend to put it into the Drs hands.

Letter to Kames, December 1737

Editing Book 2

But custom not only gives a facility to perform any action, but likewise an inclination and tendency towards it, where it is not entirely disagreeable, and can never be the object of inclination. And this is the reason why custom encreases all active habits, but diminishes passive, according to the observation of a late eminent philosopher. The facility takes off from the force of the passive habits by rendering the motion of the spirits faint and languid. But as in the active, the spirits are sufficiently supported of themselves, the tendency of the mind gives them new force, and bends them more strongly to the action.

T 2.3.5.5

Editing Book 2

Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.

T 2.3.9.8

Contradictions Aplenty

Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.

T 2.3.9.8

By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure.

T 2.1.1.4

[B]enevolence is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov’d, and a pain proceeding from his pain: From which correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure, and aversion to his pain.

T 2.2.9.15

AS all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and secondary... Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures [heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other]: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.

T 2.1.1.1 [T 1.1.2.1]

By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities... [U]nder the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security.

T 2.1.1.4

Contradictions Aplenty

By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain of pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities... WE come now to explain the direct passions, or the impressions, which arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure... ’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction... ’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object... THE impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition... Desire arises from good consider’d simply, and aversion is deriv’d from evil. The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the min or body...

Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable... These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.

Before

Men are vain of the beauty of their country, of their county, of their parish. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleasure. This pleasure is related to pride. The object or cause of this pleasure is, by the supposition, related to self, or the object of pride. By this double relation of impressions and ideas, a transition is made from the one impression to the other.

T 2.1.9.6

After

Men are vain of the beauty either of their country, or their county, or even of their parish. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleasure. This pleasure is related to pride. The object or cause of this pleasure is, by the supposition, related to self, the object of pride. By this double relation of sentiments and ideas, a transition is made from one to the other.

P 2.22

Before

In the third place, ’tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object. Thus a man, who, by any injury from another, is very much discompos’d and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, who was the cause of his first passion.

T 2.1.4.4

After

In the third place, it is observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made, where they both concur in the same object. Thus, a man, who, by an injury received from another, is very much discomposed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of hatred, discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially, if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, who was the object of his first emotion.

P 2.8

Before

THE passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions, ’tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions.

T 2.1.2.1

’TIS altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and hatred; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition.

T 2.2.1.1

The second quality, which I discover in these passions [pride and humility]... is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility.

T 2.1.5.4

After

Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.

P 2.1

Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or services: Hatred, the contrary.

P 2.2

[I]t is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction.

P 2.4

Objects and Causes

[E]nvy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own... The enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own.

T 2.2.8.12

In these two sets of passion, there is an obvious distinction to be made between the object of the passion and its cause. The object of pride and humility is self: The cause of the passion is some excellence in the former case; some fault, in the latter. The object of love and hatred is some other person: The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults.

P 2.3

Effect or Part of the Cause?

The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion [of pride], connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac’d betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc’d by it.

T 2.1.2.4

In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, viz. the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion.

T 2.1.6.5

A Broken Pattern

Fixed?

Context

There is another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity.

Hobbes, Human Nature, chapter 9

[T]he nearer we search into human Nature, the more we shall be convinced, that the Moral Virtues are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride.

Mandeville, Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue

Pity, Malice, and Envy

Compassion frequently arises, where there is no preceding esteem or friendship; and compassion is an uneasiness in the sufferings of another. It seems to spring from the intimate and strong conception of his sufferings; and our imagination proceeds by degrees, from the lively idea to the real feeling of another’s misery.

Malice and envy also arise in the mind without any preceding hatred or injury; though their tendency is exactly the same with that of anger and ill-will. The comparison of ourselves with others seems to be the source of envy and malice. The more unhappy another is, the more happy do we ourselves appear in our own conception.

P 3.7-8

1739: Vanity is not original

Among these phænomena we may esteem it a very favourable one to our present purpose, that tho’ fame in general be agreeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and approve of, than of those, whom we hate and despise... But if the mind received from any original instinct a desire of fame, and aversion to infamy, fame and infamy wou’d influence us without distinction; and every opinion, according as it were favourable or unfavourable, wou’d equally excite that desire or aversion.

T 2.1.11.11

1751: Oh yes it is

There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination, that is secondary and interested. In the same manner, there are mental passions, by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to interest; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of self-love, and desire of happiness. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me.

M App2.12

1757: Oh no it isn’t

Our opinions of all kinds are strongly affected by society and sympathy, and it is almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment, against the universal consent of every one, with whom we have any friendship or correspondence. But of all our opinions, those, which we form in our own favour; however lofty or presuming; are, at bottom, the frailest, and the most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of others... Hence that strong love of fame, with which all mankind are possessed. It is in order to fix and confirm their favourable opinion of themselves, not from any original passion, that they seek the applauses of others.

P 2.33

The Doctrine of Liberty

... this fanstasical system of liberty ... arguments against liberty or free-will ... the doctrine of liberty [is] absurd... in one sense, and unintelligible in any other.

T 2.3.1.15, T 2.3.1.18, T 2.3.2.1

I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty... and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words... But to proceed in this reconciling project... By liberty... we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we chuse to remain at rest, we may; if we chuse to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prisoner and in chains.

E 8.3, 8.23

The Will

I desire it may be observ’d, that by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.

T 2.3.1.2

Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty.

T 2.3.3.9

Passages Cut from the Treatise

’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction... ’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object[.]

T 2.3.3.3

Passages Cut from the Treatise

Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.

T 2.3.3.4

’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.

T 2.3.3.6

Passages Cut from the Treatise

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. ’Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they represent.

T 2.3.3.5

Before

We may add to this a remark; that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrify’d, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and ’tis only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure. In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being soften’d by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention.

T 1.3.9.15

During

There is no passion of the human mind but what may arise from poetry; tho’ at the same time the feelings of the passions are very different when excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from belief and reality. A passion, which is disagreeable in real life, may afford the highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic poem. In the latter case it lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other than the agreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rouzing the attention.

T 1.3.10.10 (appendix addition, 1740)

After

There is, however, a diffculty in applying to the present subject, in its full extent, this solution, however ingenious and satisfactory it may appear. It is certain, that the same object of distress, which pleases in a tragedy, were it really set before us, would give the most unfeigned uneasiness; though it be then the most effectual cure to languor and indolence.

Tr 6

The pathetic description of the butchery, made by Verres of the Sicilian captains, is a masterpiece of this kind: But I believe none will affirm, that the being present at a melancholy scene of that nature would afford any entertainment. Neither is the sorrow here softened by fiction: For the audience were convinced of the reality of every circumstance.

Tr 8

Before

’TIS easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, ’tis only requisite to present some good or evil...

When good is certain or probable, it produces Joy. When evil is in the same situation there arises Grief or Sorrow.

When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to Fear or Hope, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other.

Desire arises from good consider’d simply, and Aversion is deriv’d from evil. The Will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body.

Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.

T 2.3.9.1, 2.3.9.5–8

After

SOME objects produce immediately an agreeable sensation, by the original structure of our organs, and are thence denominated Good; as others, from their immediate disagreeable sensation, acquire the appellation of Evil. Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good; excessive heat painful and evil.

Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to passion, excite an agreeable or painful sensation; and are thence called Good or Evil. The punishment of an adversary, by gratifying revenge, is good; the sickness of a companion, by affecting friendship, is evil...

When good is certain or probable, it produces Joy. When evil is in the same situation, there arises Grief or Sorrow.

When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to Fear or Hope, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other.

Desire arises from good considered simply, and Aversion is derived from evil. The Will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body.

P 1.1–2, 4–6