1. Norris’s God

It being therefore concluded, that the Idea of God must be lodg’d in this his Name; let us now consider what this Idea of God is which is there lodg’d. And for this we must attend in the first place to the true sense and signification of this Name of God, I am that am, or, I am. Now this can signifie no other, but Being it self, or Universal Being, or Being in General, Being in the Abstract, without any restriction or limitation. …

But this must be further explain’d, before it be further confirm’d. In order to which, I consider, that as, in every particular order or kind of Being there is a Universal Nature, under which all singulars are comprehended, and whereof they all partake: as for instance, there is the Nature or Essence of a Circle or Triangle in common, as well as this or that particular Circle or Triangle. So in Beings consider’d as Beings, there is Being in general, Universal Being, Being it self, or the Essence of Being, as well as this or that Being in particular.

Again I consider, that all other Universals or Abstract Essences are really distinct from, and exist out of those singulars whose Essences they are. This must of necessity be allow’d, whatever the Peripatetics remonstrate to the contrary. Things must exist in Idea before they do in Nature, otherwise ’twill be impossible to give an intelligible account of the stability of Science, and of propositions of Eternal Truth. But this I have already demonstrated in my Metaphysical Essay…

Norris, Reason and Religion, 1689

2. Norris on Desire and Benevolence

But notwithstanding this variety [in the different kinds of love] I believe all will be comprehended under these two in general, Concupiscence and Benevolence. This I take to be the First and great Division of Love, to which all the several kinds of it may be aptly reduced. For when I Consider the Motion of Love, I find it tends to two things, namely to the good which a man wills to any one, whether it be to himself or to another, and to him to whom this good is will’d. So that the Motion of Love may be Consider’d either barely as a Tendency towards good, or as a willing this good to some person or Being. If it be consider’d in the first way, then ’tis what we call Concupiscence or Desire, if in the second, then ’tis what we call Benevolence or Charity.

Norris, The Theory and Regulation of Love, 1688

3. Norris on the Love of God

Jesus replied: “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments.”

Matthew 22:37-40

3. Norris on the Love of God

It is most clear and certain, that God only is to be loved, if God be the only proper Object of our Love; and ’tis as clear, that he is the only proper Object of our Love, if he only be our Good; and ’tis as clear that he only is our Good, if he only does us Good, if he only perfects and betters our Beings; and ’tis as clear that he only does so, if he be the only true Cause of all our Pleasure, of all those grateful Sensations whereof we are Conscious, and wherewith we are affected.

Norris, Discourse Concerning the Measure of Divine Love, 1693

3. Norris on the Love of God

• POL: The proper objects of our love are (all and only) the things that cause us pleasure.
• OCC: God is the only thing that causes us pleasure.
• Therefore, God is the only proper object of our love.

4. Astell’s Problem

Methinks there is all the reason in the World to conclude, That GOD is the only efficient Cause of all our Sensations; and you have made it as clear as the Day; and it is equally clear from the Letter of the Commandment, That GOD is not only the Principal, but the sole Object of our Love: But the reason you assign for it, namely, Because he is the only efficient Cause of our Pleasure, seems not equally clear. For if we must Love nothing but what is Lovely, and nothing is Lovely but what is our Good, and nothing is our Good but what does us Good, and nothing does us Good but what causes Pleasure in us; may we not by the same way of arguing say, That that which Causes Pain in us does not do us Good, (for nothing you say does us Good but what Causes Pleasure) and therefore can’t be our Good, and if not our Good then not Lovely, and consequently not the proper, much less the only Object of our Love? Again, if the Author of our Pleasure be upon that account the only Object of our Love, then by the same reason the Author of our Pain can’t be the Object of our Love; and if both these Sensations be produced by the same Cause, then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love, and of our Aversion; for it is as natural to avoid and fly from Pain, as it is to follow and pursue Pleasure?

Astell, Letters Concerning the Love of God, 1695

5. Norris’s Solution

To which I Answer, That if that which causes Pain does it in all respects after the same manner as it causes Pleasure, the causing of Pain will, for ought I can at present see to the contrary, be as good an Argument for its not being to be lov’d, as its causing Pleasure is for its being to be loved. But thus it is not in the present Supposition. Though I acknowledge Pain to be as truly the Effect of GOD as Pleasure (for I know not what else shou’d cause it) yet it is not after the same manner the Effect of GOD as Pleasure is. Pleasure is the natural, genuine and direct Effect of GOD, but Pain comes from him only indirectly and by Accident. … GOD’s antecedent and primary Design is the Happiness of all his Creatures (for ’twas for this that he made them) but if any of them, in the event prove miserable, ’tis wholly besides his first Design, and only by a subsequent and secondary Will. Again, when GOD causes Pleasure, ’tis because he wills it for its self, and naturally delights in it, as comporting with his primary Design which is the Happiness of his Creatures; but when he causes Pain, ’tis not that he wills it from within, or for it self (for so ’tis not at all lovely) but only from without, and for the sake of something else as it is necessary to the Order of his Justice. For you are to consider, that if there had been no Sin, there wou’d never have been such a thing as Pain, which is a plain Argument that GOD wills our Pleasure as we are Creatures, and our Pain only as we are Sinners.

Norris, Letters Concerning the Love of God, 1695

5. Norris’s Solution

• POL´: The proper objects of our love are (all and only) the things that intentionally cause us pleasure, with this as their primary intention.
• OCC´: God is the only thing that intentionally causes us pleasure, with this as his primary intention.
• Therefore, God is the only proper object of our love.

6. Astell’s Solution

For the Truth is, my Letter was principally designed in Favor of a Notion which I have entertain’d, (and which you further confirm me in by what you add in your Postscript,) viz. That Afflictions, by which we usually understand something Painful, are not Evil but Good, which at first seem’d to be contradicted by your Assertion, That nothing does us good but what causes Pleasure[.]

Astell, Letters Concerning the Love of God, 1695

6. Astell’s Solution

• POL´´: The proper objects of our love are (all and only) the things that do us good.
• OCC´´: God is the only thing that does us good.
• Therefore, God is the only proper object of our love.

7. A More Stubborn Problem

No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one, and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon. [Matthew 6:24] Here we are plainly told, that we cannot divide between God and the Creature; but that adhering to the one is the rejecting of the other. And the reason is, not only because our Natural Faculties and Capacities are too Narrow and Scanty to be employ’d upon two such vastly different Objects; but also because we cannot love either of them but upon such a Principle as must utterly exclude the love of the other. … If then the Creature be our Good, let us love that and that only, that and not God; but if God be our true Good (as most certainly he is) then let us love God and God only, God and not the Creature.

Norris, Discourse Concerning the Measure of Divine Love, 1693

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