The Effects of the Passions

The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and specious division [between calm and violent emotions], that I may proceed with the greater order; and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas, shall now explain those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.

T 2.1.1.3

Castrating Books 1 and 2

Your Thoughts & mine agree with Respect to Dr Butler, and I wou’d be glad to be introduc’d to him. I am at present castrating my Work, that is, cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it shall give as little Offence as possible; before which I cou’d not pretend to put it into the Drs hands.

Letter to Kames, December 1737

The Religious Passion

Hence the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety and devotion: Hence, it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man’s morals from the fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believe them sincere. Nay, it has been observed, that enormities of the blackest dye have been rather apt to produce superstitious terrors, and encrease the religious passion.

N 14.7

The Religious Passion

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F E A R

The Religious Passion

Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, Religion; not allowed, Superstition. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, True Religion.

Hobbes’s Leviathan, part 1, chapter 6
(Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the Passions)

Natural History

I do not intend to provide a systematic analysis of the Natural History, but rather to catch some of its difficulties by concentrating on its title, which not only tells us the object (religion), but also designates a certain scientific or philosophical genre, and thus should reflect Hume’s method, if not his intention. How can such a text qualify as a natural history? Can we not, by commenting upon this appellation, define the method employed by Hume? And since method is the way towards some end, could we not thus try to delineate the real aims of the text?

Malherbe 1995, p. 256

Natural History

Conjectural History?

Hume... should not be seen as a shoddy historian; he should, instead, be seen as a different kind of historian... interested in what Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) calls a speculative or conjectural history.

Bailey & O’Brien 2014, p. 168

Natural History

Natural History

Natural History

The Register of Knowledge of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two sorts: one called Natural History; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are the Histories of Metalls, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.

Hobbes’s Leviathan, part 1, chapter 9

Natural History

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Psychology

What those principles are, which give rise to the original belief [the origin of religion in human nature], and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation, is the subject of our present enquiry.

N 0.1

Natural History

You ask, why he chuses to give it this title. Would not the Moral history of Meteors be full as sensible as the Natural history of Religion? Without doubt... But this great Philosopher is never without his Reasons. It is to insinuate, that what the world calls Religion, of which he undertakes to give the history, is not founded in the Judgment, but in the Passions only.

Hurd/Warburton 1757, p. 9

Natural History

And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

Hobbes’s Leviathan, part 1, chapter 12

Natural History

But as there is no perfection in this frail State, nor any excellency without some defect accompanying it, so these noble faculties of the Mind have misled and betrayed us into Superstition... which could not have thus happened in all Ages, unless something innate in our Constitutions made us easily to be susceptible of wrong Impressions, subject to Panick Fears, and prone to Superstition and Error, and therefore it is incumbent upon us, first of all to examine into the frame and constitution of our own Bodies, and search into the causes of our Passions and Infirmities, for till we know from what Source or Principle we are so apt to be deceived by others, and by our selves, we can never be capable of true Knowledge, much less of true Religion, which is the perfection of it.

Trenchard’s Natural History of Superstition

Polytheism Is Primary

It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were polytheists. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold then the clear testimony of history. The farther we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into polytheism... The north, the south, the east, the west, give their unanimous testimony to the same fact. What can be opposed to so full an evidence?

N 1.2

The Jews’ theism stands for nothing; nor do the sceptical principles of some philosophers! ... What could be opposed to so indistinct and so uncritical an evidence?

Malherbe 1995, p. 262

Polytheism Is Primary

What can be opposed to so full an evidence? Nothing, perhaps, except the ‘doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations’ (emphasis added) he mentions all too briefly. These he claims ‘form no objection worth regarding’ (NHR 4:310). But for an empirical study of the nature he presumably is undertaking they do form a critically important exception because they militate from the start against not only his account of the origin of polytheism, but especially the subsequent derivation of traditional theism. Unless he can explain, rather than ignore, such anomalies—present as far back as his evidence goes—his causal account is not so much false as fundamentally misleading and incomplete: the empirical evidence available to him offers no reason to believe that polytheism was the original religion of mankind.

Webb 1991, p. 147

The Psychological Argument

It seems certain, that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature... The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior... Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the divine nature. But though I allow, that the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument; yet I can never think, that this consideration could have an influence on mankind, when they formed their first rude notions of religion.

N 1.5

The Psychological Argument

The causes of such objects, as are quite familiar to us, never strike our attention or curiosity; and however extraordinary or surprising these objects in themselves, they are passed over, by the raw and ignorant multitude, without much examination or enquiry... On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more is he familiarized to it, and the less inclined to scrutinize and examine it. A monstrous birth excites his curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately sets him a trembling, and sacrificing, and praying. But an animal, compleat in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious opinion or affection. Ask him, whence that animal arose; he will tell you, from the copulation of its parents. And these, whence? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance, that he entirely loses sight of them. Imagine not, that he will so much as start the question, whence the first animal; much less, whence the whole system or united fabric of the universe arose.

N 1.6

Explaining the Exceptions

It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that though men admit the existence of several limited deities, yet is there some one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of their worship and adoration... Whether this god... be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men’s fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of adulation... till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no farther progress...

N 6.5

Explaining the Exceptions

... And it is well, if, in striving to get farther, and to represent a magnificent simplicity, they run not into inexplicable mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration can be founded. While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect being, the creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition.

N 6.5

Thus, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, became the supreme deity or Jehovah of the Jews.

N 6.8

The Design Argument

It seems certain, that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature... The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior... Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the divine nature. But though I allow, that the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument; yet I can never think, that this consideration could have an influence on mankind, when they formed their first rude notions of religion.

N 1.5

The Design Argument

In proportion as any man’s course of life is governed by accident, we always find, that he encreases in superstition... All human life, especially before the institution of order and good government, being subject to fortuitous accidents; it is natural, that superstition should prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the most earnest enquiry concerning those invisible powers, who dispose of their happiness or misery. Ignorant of astronomy and the anatomy of plants and animals, and too little curious to observe the admirable adjustment of final causes; they remain still unacquainted with a first and supreme creator, and with that infinitely perfect spirit, who alone, by his almighty will, bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. Such a magnificent idea is too big for their narrow conceptions, which can neither observe the beauty of the work, nor comprehend the grandeur of its author.

N 3.3

The Design Argument

Many theists, even the most zealous and refined, have denied a particular providence, and have asserted, that the Sovereign mind or first principle of all things, having fixed general laws, by which nature is governed, gives free and uninterrupted course to these laws, and disturbs not, at every turn, the settled order of events by particular volitions. From the beautiful connexion, say they, and rigid observance of established rules, we draw the chief argument for theism; and from the same principles are enabled to answer the principal objections against it.

N 6.2

The Design Argument

The vulgar, that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and uninstructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable or animal bodies; so far as to discover a supreme mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every part of nature. They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, they regard, with perpetual attention, the unknown causes, which govern all these natural events, and distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but silent, operation. The unknown causes are still appealed to on every emergence; and in this general appearance or confused image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and apprehensions.

N 8.1

Hope and Fear

Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either side; but is incessantly tossed from one to another, and is determined, one moment, to consider an object as existent, and another moment as the contrary... Suppose, then, that the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either desire or aversion; it is evident, that, according as the mind turns itself to one side or the other, it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow... According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of grief or joy predominates in the composition; and these passions being intermingled by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the passions of hope or fear.

P 1.8-10

Hope and Fear

It is a probable good or evil, which commonly causes hope or fear; because probability, producing an inconstant and wavering survey of an object, occasions naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of passion. But we may observe, that, wherever, from other causes, this mixture can be produced, the passions of fear and hope will arise, even though there be no probability.

P 1.14

The Design Argument

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Hume’s Account of Fear

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The Fear of God is Impossible